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RETHINKING SULLA: THE CASE OF THE ROMAN SENATE* 
 
 
Pressing and urgent domestic problems were the justification for L. Cornelius Sulla’s election 
to the dictatorship in 82 B.C.1 He responded with an extensive legislative programme which 
reorganized the judicial and legislative processes of the res publica.2 Whilst there is 
agreement, in broad terms, about the nature of these changes, their purpose and significance 
remain debated.3 Nonetheless, there is general consensus that the Senate’s role in Sulla’s res 
                                                 
* The research for this article was supported by the British Academy, through its Mid-Career 
Fellowship scheme. I am grateful to audiences at Durham, Cambridge and Trinity St. David 
and to CQ’s anonymous referee for their responses to its earlier versions. 
1 Appian (B Civ. 1.99) records that Sulla was elected ἐπὶ  θέσει νόμων ... καὶ  καταστάσει τῆς 
πολιτείας. The description is plausibly understood as a translation of the phrase legibus 
scribundis et rei publicae constituendae (E. Gabba, Appiani Bellorum civilium liber primus 
[Florence, 19672], 270-1). 
2 The major changes were i) restrictions on the tribunate of the plebs, which ceased to have 
either positive or negative legislative capacity; ii) increases in the numbers of quaestorships 
and praetorships, with automatic Senate entry for quaestors; iii) a reorganisation of the 
iudicia publica and the restriction of jury service to senators. Tribunes of the plebs were 
barred from holding further office. 
3 See T. Hantos, Res publica constituta. Die Verfassung des Dictators Sulla (Stuttgart, 1988); 
F. Hurlet, La dictature de Sylla (Brussels, 1993); T.C. Brennan, The Praetorship in the 
Roman Republic, 2 vols. (New York, 2000), 388-402; A. Thein, ‘Sulla the Weak Tyrant’, in 
S. Lewis (ed.), Ancient Tyranny (Edinburgh, 2006), 238-49. 
publica was enhanced in comparison with earlier periods.4 This conclusion is based on the 
increase in the size of the Senate; the monopoly it resumed of judicial decision-making in the 
iudicia publica; and the extension, in practice, of its legislative capacity, given that its 
decrees could not be vetoed by tribunes of the plebs, who had also lost their capacity to put 
forward legislation. Flower offers a recent and concise summary: ‘This new “consensus” of 
Sulla was based on force and on the necessity of agreeing with Sulla himself, and 
subsequently with his new, mighty senate that was expected to wield unprecedented power 
and absolute authority.’5  
 
Two hypotheses are required to support this view of Sulla’s Senate: first, that his proposals 
were designed to enhance the role of the Senate, or even, in a stronger version, to ensure that 
it monopolized political power; and secondly, that they were implemented in such a way that, 
                                                 
4 E.g. E.S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974: 7-12); C. 
Meier,  Res publica amissa. Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der späten röimischen 
Republik (Wiesbaden, 19802), 246-66; F. Millar, The Crowd at Rome in the late Republic 
(Ann Arbor, 1998), 49-54; H. Flower, The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace and Oblivion in 
Roman political culture (Chapel Hill, 2006), 98; U. Gotter, ‘Cultural differences and cross-
cultural contact: Greek and Roman concepts of power’, HSPh 104 (2008), 179-230, at 214-
16; T.P. Wiseman, Remembering the Roman People: essays on late-Republican politics and 
literature (Oxford,  2009), 11. 
5 Flower (n. 4), 98; the comment is particularly striking as it comes from what is otherwise an 
incisive and highly revisionist reading of Sulla. H. Flower, Roman Republics (Princeton, 
2010), 121-134 implicitly revises this analysis of the role of the Senate, though it remains 
unclear how it fitted into the model presented there of a Sullan republic dominated by the rule 
of law (129-30) . 
in practice, the Senate acquired greater power and authority than it had had previously. The 
purpose of this paper is to scrutinize these claims: it will suggest that neither can be accepted 
without modification. Sulla’s package of constitutional change combined solutions to specific 
problems with an attempt to eliminate conflict from the res publica, and the resulting mix of 
measures was incoherent. The Senate’s position was different as a result of Sulla’s changes, 
but not necessarily stronger. In addition, their implementation was affected both by the nature 
of his dictatorship and by the recent history of the Senate. These factors created a Senate 
which was structurally weak, divided, and ineffectual.  
 
A determination to remove opportunities for destructive conflict from the structure of the res 
publica is a convincing framework within which to understand the changes Sulla introduced 
to the role of the tribunate of the plebs and to the composition of juries, both of which had 
effects on the role and composition of the Senate. Every episode of domestic violence over 
the previous half-century had had its origins in a dispute over legislation proposed by a 
tribune.6 Sulla’s own consulship in 88 had come under unprecedented attack from the tribune 
Sulpicius, and he had narrowly escaped death in the rioting which occurred as a result of 
Sulpicius’ proposals and which had led to the death of his daughter’s husband.7 The kind of 
arguments which could be put forward to legitimize the restriction of the tribunate to 
                                                 
6 See, in general, Meier (n. 4), 128-140; J. Bleicken, ‘Das römische Volkstribunat’, Chiron 11 
(1981), 87-108; J.A. North, ‘Democratic politics in Republican Rome’, P&P 126 (1990), 3-
21; A.W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999), 67-73; Wiseman 
(n. 4) 7-10. 
7 Liv. Per. 77; Plut. Sull. 8; App. B Civ. 1.56; R. Morstein-Marx, ‘Consular appeals to the 
army in 88 and 87’, in H. Beck et al. (edd.), Consuls and res publica: holding high office in 
the Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2011), 259-278, at 262-264. 
prouocatio on behalf of individual citizens are also evident: that that was the initial function 
of the tribunate and that the legislative activity by individual tribunes was supported by an 
unrepresentative faction with the citizen body.8 However far the ban on tribunician 
legislation seemed to subsequent commentators to be an unworkable and unstable attempt to 
silence the urban populace, we need not posit an unsustainable level of self-delusion on 
Sulla’s part in the belief that restricting legislation to citizens voting in the comitia centuriata 
on proposals put forward by consuls and praetors might solve, or at least substantially 
mitigate, the problem of violent factionalism.9 This reorganisation of legislative practice gave 
a much greater role to imperium-holding magistrates than hitherto; it also affected the Senate, 
whose decrees no longer faced the threat of veto. 
 
The change in the composition of the juries can also plausibly be linked to eliminating 
dissension between equestrians and senators and the exploitation of that conflict by others. 
That dispute had been an important, if indirect, factor in the outbreak of the Social War in 91, 
a catastrophe from which all other more recent disasters could be seen to flow. Once Sulla 
had decided to rebuild the iudicia publica around seven new standing courts and to provide 
their juries from the Senate, it would have been apparent that many more senators would be 
                                                 
8 Flower (n. 5), 119 notes the difficulty of accessing Sulla’s own intentions. On ancient 
analyses of the legitimacy of popular politics at Rome, see A. Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa 
(London, 1990), 150-80. 
9 Cic. Leg 3.23-26; R. Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman 
Republic (Cambridge, 2004), 241-78; Wiseman (n. 4), 16-32. 
required simply in order to provide an adequate number of jurors.10 The rise in the number of 
praetors from six to eight ensured that each court had a praetorian president; and a future 
supply of an adequate number of jurors was ensured by the extraordinary growth in the 
number of quaestors to twenty.11 
 
Sulla introduced a variety of changes to the Senate. Senatorial membership had been the 
responsibility of the censors: but the senatorial lectio was now replaced, as the means of 
entering the Senate, by the elections for the quaestorship, since quaestors now participated in 
the Senate from their election, even if they were not formally members until enrolled by the 
censors.12 The role of princeps senatus appears to have fallen into abeyance, and the 
princeps’ privileged speaking position during debate to have fallen to one of the consulars, 
whose identity changed from year to year.13 The consular who would speak first that year 
was identified at the start of the year by the consul who presided during January, and was 
                                                 
10 A. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time (Oxford, 1901), 436-42. The 
alternative of making jurors entirely non-senatorial was presumably unthinkable because of 
the connection between equestrian jurors and Gaius Gracchus and other popularis politicians. 
11 The exact number of quaestors before Sulla’s expansion of the office is unclear, though it 
was between eight and twelve: W. V. Harris, ‘The Development of the Quaestorship, 267-81 
B.C.’, CQ 26 (1976), 92-106; W. Kunkel, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen 
Republik (Munich, 1995), 512-14. 
12 F.X. Ryan,  Rank and participation in the Republican Senate (Stuttgart, 1998), 72-87. 
13 The details of this transition, including Sulla’s role in it, are unclear; see Ryan (n. 12), 284-
92. 
expected to agree with that consul.14 The presence of all eight praetors in Rome during their 
year in office, the tendency for the consuls also to be present throughout the year, and the 
much earlier elections contributed to a major change in the nature of senatorial debate, in 
which magistrates now played a much more dominant role.15 The post-Sullan Senate was run 
by the consuls, with a significant role in the second half of the year for the consuls-elect.16 
                                                 
14 That is the implication of Cic. Att. 1.13.2, where he consoles himself for losing first place 
to C. Calpurnius Piso with the thought that ‘I am free from paying attention to a difficult man 
[sc. the consul Pupius Piso] and free to preserve my position in the res publica by opposing 
his wishes; moreover, the second place in speaking has almost as much influence as the first, 
and one’s stance is less tied by a favour from the consul’ (sum enim et ab obseruando homine 
peruerso liber et ad dignitatem in re publica retinendam contra illius uoluntatem solutus, et 
ille secundus in dicendo locus habet auctoritatem paene principis, uoluntatem non nimis 
deuinctam beneficio consulis). Despite Cicero’s special pleading about second place, this is 
clear evidence for the bond of gratitude which tied the year’s senior consular to the consul 
who chose him. 
15 They remained, however, formally outside senatorial debates: the Senate’s role, after all, 
was to advise magistrates. 
16 In contrast, before 81 there were years in which, after the Feriae Latinae, the only 
imperium holders in the city were the urban and peregrine praetors. Although it is now 
accepted – or should be – that Sulla did not prevent consuls from exercising their imperium 
outside Rome, it remains unclear why they now tended to stay (they did not, after all, receive 
new responsibilities as the praetors did which prevented their departure). F. Pina Polo, The 
consul at Rome (Cambridge, 2011), 316-28 discusses the change in the tempo of political life 
which followed from this development. Consuls-elect had possessed a privileged position in 
senatorial debates long before Sulla, but when elections took place towards the end of the 
Even had other factors not conspired against the authority of senior priuati in the Senate, that 
is the principes, this shift towards the presence of imperium-holders in Rome alone  
undermined their position. 
 
A range of other factors also weakened the principes. The Senate which Sulla found after his 
victory in 82 had been hollowed out by the violence of previous years; the proscriptions he 
presided over compounded the effect. As few as half those enrolled by the censors in 86 
might now still be alive and able to attend.17 One particularly striking aspect of these losses 
was the very small number of ex-consuls and ex-praetors present.18 When Sulla assumed the 
dictatorship in 82, he was still the most junior surviving consular present in Rome, despite 
having held the office in 88: everyone who had held that office with him or subsequent to 
                                                                                                                                                        
year its use was limited: see F. Pina Polo, ‘The Political Role of the consules designati at 
Rome’, Historia 62 (2013), 420-452 
17 Eutropius (5.9.2) and Orosius (5.22.4) give almost identical figures for numbers killed in 
the Social and Civil wars: the figure for senators is 200, though some of the deficit may have 
been filled by the censors of 86. Forty senators were on Sulla’s proscription list (App. B. Civ. 
1.95); he gives ninety (B.Civ 1.103) as the final number of senators killed by Sulla. F. 
Santangelo, ‘Sulla and the Senate: a reconsideration’, Cahiers Glotz 17 (2006 [2008]), 7-22, 
at 8 concludes that the Senate Sulla found in 82 may have been as small as 150. R.J. Evans, 
‘The Augustan ‘purge’ of the Senate and the census of 86 B.C.’, Acta Classica 40 (1997), 77-
86, at 80-1 notes in connection with the census of 86 the possible effects of deaths during the 
wars with the Cimbri and Teutones towards the end of the second century B.C.; but by the 
end of 80s B.C., those losses had probably ceased to have an impact. 
18 R.J. Evans, ‘The consulares and praetorii in the Roman Senate at the beginning of Sulla’s 
dictatorship’, Athenaeum 61 (1983), 521-8 lists the members of each category. 
him was dead, about to die, or in exile.19 This is an extraordinary rate of attrition, 
unparalleled in any other period of Republican history.20 Moreover, these losses were in 
addition to consular deaths during the Social War, and the deaths of earlier holders of the 
                                                 
19 There are ten men in this category, eight of whom died violently. Q. Pompeius Rufus (cos. 
88) was killed, during his consulship, by the troops of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, when he 
attempted to take command of them; Cn. Octavius (cos. 87) and L. Cornelius Merula (cos. 
suff. 87) died during Marius’ and Cinna’s capture of Rome in 87; L. Cornelius Cinna (cos. 87, 
86, 85, 84) was killed by his own troops in 84; L. Valerius Flaccus (cos. suff. 86) was killed 
during his consulship, by his troops, whilst campaigning against Mithridates; Cn. Papirius 
Carbo (cos. 85, 84, 82) was executed by Pompeius during his third consulship; C. Norbanus 
(cos. 83) committed suicide on Rhodes following defeat by Sulla’s followers; the younger 
Marius (cos. 82) was killed during his consulship as he tried to escape from the siege of 
Praeneste. The elder Marius died of natural causes, aged around seventy, early in his seventh 
consulship in 86; L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes (cos. 83) was in exile in Massilia after his 
defeat and proscription by Sulla during his consulship (he survived into the 60s: R. Kaster, 
Cicero: speech on behalf of Publius Sestius [Oxford, 2006], 126). 
20 Even an equivalent span of the opening years of the Second Punic War are not quite as 
destructive: at the end of 212, nine holders of the office since 218 (inclusive) were still alive 
(P. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 218), Ti. Sempronius Longus (cos. 218), M. Atilius Regulus (cos. 
suff. 217), C Terentius Varro (cos. 216), M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. suff. 215, cos. 214), Q. 
Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (cos. suff. 215, cos. 214), Q. Fabius Maximus (cos. 213), Q. 
Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 212) and App. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 212), in comparison with five 
dead: Cn Servilius (cos. 217), C. Flaminius (cos. 217), L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 216), L. 
Postumius Albinus (cos. des. 215) and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (cos. 215, 213); Scipio and 
Pulcher died in 211. 
office during the civil conflicts of 88-87 and of 82.21 In consequence, only four consulars, 
apart from Sulla, are known to have been alive and able to participate in the Senate in 82: L. 
Valerius Flaccus (cos. 100); C. Valerius Flaccus (cos. 93); M. Perperna (cos. 92); and L. 
Marcius Philippus (cos. 91).22 L. Flaccus led the senatorial negotiations with Sulla after the 
latter’s arrival in Italy, and as interrex after Sulla’s victory he ensured some semblance of 
                                                 
21 T. Didius (cos. 98), P. Rutilius Lupus (cos. 90) and L. Porcius Cato (cos. 89) were killed 
during the Social War; A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 99) was murdered by his troops and Sex. 
Iulius Caesar  (cos. 91) died of disease during the siege of Asculum. M.’ Aquillius (cos. 101) 
was killed by Mithridates in 88 and Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89) died of disease during the 
Octavian war in 87. M. Antonius (cos. 99) and L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 90) were killed after 
Marius’ and Cinna’s capture of Rome that year and Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102) committed 
suicide. Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) was killed on Damasippus’ orders in 82. 
22 Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105) was in exile in Smyrna; he was still alive in 78, when Cicero 
visited him (Brut. 85). In 49, at the start of the Civil War between Pompeius and Caesar, 
when the existence of consulars is well-documented, twenty-two are known to be alive: 
Perperna (cos. 92); Pompeius (70); L. Aurelius Cotta (65); L. Iulius Caesar (64); C. Antonius 
(63); Cicero (63); Afranius (60); Caesar (59); Bibulus (59); Piso Caesoninus (58); Gabinius 
(58); Lentulus Spinther (57); L. Marcius Philippus (56); Domitius Ahenobarbus (54); Appius 
Claudius (54); Domitius Calvinus (53); Valerius Rufus (53); Metellus Scipio (52), Ser. 
Sulpicius Rufus (51); M. Marcellus (51); C. Marcellus (50); L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus 
(50). Two of these (Antonius and Gabinius) were certainly in exile. R. Syme, The Augustan 
Aristocracy (Oxford 1986), 15-31 draws attention to patterns of mortality among the elite, 
including (22-3) apparently high mortality in the mid-50s. On the other hand, it may be rash 
to assume that every consular unnoted in the sources was dead, even in a well-documented 
period: Perperna (n. 24 below) is a useful counter-example. 
propriety to the installation of Sulla as dictator; he was, moroever, Sulla’s Master of Horse.23 
His cousin C. Flaccus appears to have missed all the domestic excitements of the previous 
decade, through an extraordinarily extended proconsular command in the Spains and Gaul: he 
returned to Rome, and a triumph, only in 81 B.C. These men – both, like Sulla himself, 
patricians – played an important part initially in legitimizing Sulla’s activity, but neither 
seems to have played a prominent role after 81. M. Perperna was, as far as is known, almost 
entirely inactive, and this may be connected with his son’s opposition to Sulla; but he was 
still alive.24 The only pre-82 consular who is attested as an active member of the post-Sullan 
Senate was L. Marcius Philippus. Information for men of praetorian standing is less 
complete, but indicates a similar pattern.25 Eight ex-praetors can firmly be placed in the 
                                                 
23 He had been flamen Martialis since before his consulship in 100, and the taboos which 
prevented the holder of that office from undertaking military activity had helped his life-
expectancy. 
24 His death in 49 B.C., at the age of 98, is the subject of anecdote (Plin. HN 7.156, Val. Max. 
8.13.4). The only  notice of his activities after his censorship are his presence at a civil 
process (Cic. Rosc. Com. 22) and that he provided a character reference for M. Aemilius 
Scaurus at his trial on repetundae charges, probably by letter rather than in person (Asc. 
28C). It is tempting to explain this latter occasion through some connection between Perperna 
and the elder Scaurus, but that is speculation. 
25 See Evans (n. 18), though of the eleven surviving praetors he identifies, Perperna was not 
in Rome, Murena may never have held the praetorship and M. Claudius Marcellus may have 
held his praetorship after 81. He also notes eighteen ex-praetors who may or may not still 
have been alive. 
Senate in 81.26 This category produced five of the six consuls of 81-79 (with Sulla himself 
being the sixth), evidence that Sulla placed considerable importance on re-establishing a 
pattern of regular office-holding in accordance with the lex annalis.27  
 
Sulla’s Senate thus had an unprecedently tenuous connection in terms of membership with 
the body that had existed ten years’ earlier at the outbreak of the Social War. Pre-Social War 
senators who survived into the Sullan period were also subject to brutal demonstrations of the 
nature of Sulla’s power. These began even before the proscriptions. Plutarch (Sull. 30.2-3) 
records a Senate meeting which Sulla summoned soon after his victory at the Colline Gate: 
 
ἐκάλει τὴν σύγκλητον εἰ ς τὸ τῆςἘνυοῦς ἱ ερόν. ἅμα δ’ αὐτός τε λέγειν ἐνήρχετο καὶ  
κατέκοπτον οἱ  τεταγμένοι τοὺς ἑξακισχιλίους. κραυγῆς δέ, ὡς εἰ κός, ἐν χωρίῳ 
μικρῷ τοσούτων σφαττομένων φερομένης καὶ  τῶν συγκλητικῶν ἐκπλαγέντων, 
ὥσπερ ἐτύγχανε λέγων ἀτρέπτῳ καὶ  καθεστηκότι τῷ προσώπῳ προσέχειν 
ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δ’ ἔξω γινόμενα μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖ ν· νουθετεῖ σθαι 
γὰρ αὐτοῦ κελεύσαντος ἐνίους τῶν πονηρῶν. 
                                                 
26 They are L. Gellius (pr. 94, cos. 72); P. Servilius Vatia (pr. 90, cos. 79); Q. Caecilius 
Metellus Pius (pr. 89, cos. 80); App. Claudius Pulcher (pr. 89, cos. 79); P. Gabinius (pr. 89); 
Q. Oppius (pr. 89); M. Tullius Decula (pr. ?84, cos. 81); Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (pr. ?84; 
cos. 81). A degree of circularity is, however, involved: Decula’s and Dolabella’s praetorian 
standing is assumed on the basis of their consulship in 81, since, it is argued, it is improbable 
that Sulla would ignore his lex annalis (whose passage nonetheless post-dates their election). 
On Dolabella, see further E.S. Gruen, ‘The Dolabellae and Sulla’, AJPh 87 (1966), 385-99.  
27 By 78, men who had held the praetorship in 81 were eligible to stand for the consulship. 
 He summoned the Senate to meet in the Temple of Bellona. Just as he began to speak, 
by arrangement his men began to execute the six thousand [sc. prisoners]. The noise 
of so many men being slaughtered in a small area was audible and the senators were 
terrified; but Sulla continued to speak with an unchanged and immoveable expression 
and instructed them to pay attention to what he was saying and not to worry about 
what was taking place outside; some wrong-doers were receiving correction, on his 
orders.28 
 
The Temple of Bellona was outside the pomerium, and not infrequently used as a meeting 
place for the Senate when the attendance of an imperium-holder was required; on this 
occasion, it had the added advantage of proximity to the Villa Publica and Circus Maximus, 
where prisoners of war captured after the Battle of the Colline Gate were being held.29 It had 
only been a matter of weeks since that year’s urban praetor, M. Iunius Brutus Damasippus, 
had ordered a massacre at a meeting of the Senate which he had convened; now Sulla was 
                                                 
28 The story is also told, with varying numbers of dead, by Seneca (Clem 1.12.2. ‘a few 
seditious men are being killed on my orders’, seditiosi pauculi meo iussu occidentur), Livy 
(Per.  88); Val. Max. 9.2.1; August. Civ D 3.28; Oros 5.21; Flor 2.9.24; Firm Mat. 1.7.27: see 
F. Coarelli,  ‘Il tempio di Bellona’, BCAR 80 (1965-67), 37-72, at 62 n. 113.  
29 Coarelli (n. 28); M. Bonnefond-Coudry,  Le Sénat de la République Romaine (Rome, 
1989), 151-160; C. Mackay, ‘Sulla and the Monuments: studies in his public persona’, 
Historia 49 (2000), 161-210, at 196.  
demonstrating what would happen to his enemies.30 This initial act of terror was followed 
over the next six months by the organised terror of the proscriptions. In a gruesome indication 
of the lawlessness which followed Sulla’s victory, the idea of a written list – the defining 
feature of the proscriptions, on this occasion and subsequently, and the source of the name – 
was itself presented as a concession, insofar as it set limits to what was otherwise the 
indiscriminate elimination, by Sulla’s followers, of their personal enemies.31 
 
The device of proscription turned Sulla’s purge of his and his followers’ enemies into a 
bureaucratically supported redefinition of a selected group of citizens. The property of the 
proscribed became the state’s; they themselves lost the state’s promise of protection in case 
of violence; and the citizen rights of their male descendants, for two generations, were 
curtailed.32 The neatness of the process was underscored by its having a fixed end-point of 
June 1st 81, enshrined in the law which authorised the proscriptions.33 Glimpses of the 
consequences in communities outside Rome can be caught in some of Cicero’s early 
speeches, particularly his defences of Sextus Roscius of Ameria and Cluentius: those 
members of local elites who were acknowledged supporters of Sulla were able substantially 
                                                 
30 On Damasippus’ massacre, F. Hinard, ‘La terreur comme mode de gouvernement (au cours 
des guerres civiles du 1er siècle A.C.’, in G. Urso (ed.), Terror et pavor: violenza, 
intimidazione, clandestinità nel mondo antico (Pisa, 2006), 247-64, at 254. 
31 Plut. Sull. 31.1-3; F. Hinard, Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine (Rome, 1985), 18-
37. 
32 Hinard (n. 31), 87-100; J.W. Crawford, M. Tullius Cicero, the fragmentary speeches: an 
edition with commentary (Atlanta, 1994), 201-207. 
33 Cic. Rosc. Am. 128; T. Kinsey, ‘The sale of the property of Roscius of Ameria: how illegal 
was it’, Antiquité classique 57 (1988), 296-297.  
to extend their political and economic power. Conversely, Sulla attempted to revoke the 
citizen status of some of the communities which had opposed him.34 Other Italian towns were 
now neighbours to settlements of Sullan veterans established on confiscated land.35 
 
The elimination of Sulla’s enemies through the proscriptions was accompanied by continuing 
news of their defeat overseas and the public demonstration of these successes in Rome. 
Gnaeus Pompeius had pursued the consul Carbo, captured him in Sicily and had him 
executed; Pompeius then crossed to Africa and captured and killed Cn. Domitius, one of the 
proscribed, who had raised an army and gained the support of the local ruler Iarbas. Only in 
Spain did Roman opponents of the new regime maintain a presence beyond the end of 81. On 
January 28th 81 Sulla held a triumph over Mithridates, remarkable not only for the display of 
booty but also – according to Plutarch’s account – for the presence in the procession of 
Sulla’s elite supporters declaring that they were returning from exile.36 Sulla concluded his 
triumph with a contio at which he gave an account of his res gestae and took the title 
‘Felix’.37 Also during 81, Murena held a triumph over Mithridates and C. Valerius Flaccus 
one from his campaigns in Spain and Gaul. Within a single year, three Sullan commanders 
                                                 
34 Cic. Caec. 101-103; Dom. 79; the evidence relates to Volaterrae and Arretium, and the 
Etrurian location of both cities may not be a coincidence. See further F. Santangelo, Sulla, the 
Elites and the Empire: a study of Roman policies in Italy and the Greek East (Leiden, 2007), 
172-8. 
35 A. Thein, ‘Sulla’s Veteran Settlement Policy’, in F. Daubner, F. (ed.), Militärsiedlungen 
und Territorialherrschaft in der Antike (Berlin, 2011), 79-99. 
36 Plut. Sull. 34.1 
37 Plut. Sull. 34.2 
had demonstrated the new regime’s military capacity.38 At Rome, Sulla’s unique status was 
made visible during his dictatorship in the twenty-four lictors who accompanied him. He 
altered religious practice through the addition to the annual cycle of festivals of ludi 
Victoriae, which commemorated the battle at the Colline Gate and were first held in 81; and, 
probably also in this year, he redrew the city’s boundaries by extending the pomoerium for 
the first time since the regal period.39 Rome was now, temporally and spatially, a Sullan city. 
 
The Senate, too, became Sullan. Few if any surviving senators can have been known 
opponents of Sulla, and many had welcomed his return with enthusiasm; Sulla’s relentless 
assertion of his power will surely have deterred any waverers from expressing even modest 
hesitation about the changes which were taking place. In addition, surviving senators were 
soon joined by a large number of new senators, in whose appointment support for Sulla was 
the major criterion. The act of appointment itself recalled the quinquennial censorial lectio, 
though there were important differences in the lectio of 82 or 81: Sulla did not hold the office 
of censor, he appointed a much larger number of new senators than the censors tended to, and 
                                                 
38 These were the first triumphs since Vatia had celebrated a praetorian triumph in October 
88; and not since 167 had three triumphs been celebrated in a single calendar year (T. 
Itgenshorst, Tota illa pompa: der Triumph in der römischen Republik [Göttingen, 2005], 268-
9). The impression created would be even more powerful if in fact there were four triumphs 
in 81; but the date of Pompeius’ first triumph is uncertain (E. Badian, ‘The date of Pompey’s 
first triumph’, Hermes 83 [1955], 107-118; R. Seager, Pompey the Great (London, 20022), 
29). It may have taken place on March 12th 81; but that demands a very tight timetable for his 
campaigning in Sicily and Africa, and March 12th 80 is more probable. 
39 Sen. Brev. Vit. 13; see F. Hinard, Sullana varia (Paris, 2008), 62-70.  
many of his appointees did not meet the usual criteria for senatorial membership.40 Appian 
gives the number of appointees as ‘around three hundred’ (B Civ. 1.100) and these appear to 
have been drawn from two distinct categories.41 One was those men who would have 
expected to be enrolled in the Senate at the next lectio, because they had held a qualifying 
office since the census in 86. It seems that Sulla did include this category (excluding of 
course those of its members who had fought against him in the civil war which preceded his 
dictatorship), together with that of those who had held the quaestorship since 86.42 To this 
                                                 
40 There was a precedent for co-option by a dictator in the actions of Fabius Buteo in 216, 
who replenished a dangerously diminished Senate after the battle of Cannae (Liv. 23.22-3), 
though there is no indication that Sulla was aware of the parallel. Buteo’s appointment was 
itself peculiar, since another dictator (Iunius Pera) was already in office, and no magister 
equitum was appointed for Buteo. Livy’s account includes a splendid record of Buteo’s 
speech criticizing most aspects of his appointment. Buteo’s new senators consisted of those 
who had held curule office or the position of plebeian aedile, tribune of the plebs, or quaestor 
since the census of 220 and those who displayed enemy spoils in their home or had won the 
corona ciuica. See further Ryan (n. 12), 109-10.  
41 Santangelo (n. 17) provides a full survey of the evidence. 
42 Santangelo (n. 17), 16 lists those in this category, with ten secure identifications. Before 
Sulla the censors appears to have regularly recruited aediles, and some quaestors may also 
have been included, depending on vacancies, which naturally varied between censuses; 
tribunes of the plebs were always included after the passage of the lex Atinia, which is 
plausibly dated to the second half of the second century (R.F. Vishnia, ‘Lex Atinia de tribunis 
plebis in senatum legendis’, MH 46 [1989], 163-76). There is no attested example among 
Sulla’s appointees of someone who had held the tribunate of the plebs and no other pre-
extent, his lectio followed traditional practice. But ex-office holders, even including ex-
quaestors, could have provided only a fraction of the number which Sulla had decided to 
recruit, particularly given that some in this category had been killed during the fighting and 
others were ineligible because they were Sulla’s enemies.43 Consequently, we can reasonably 
infer – although no individual in this category can be identified with complete confidence – 
that the remaining Sullan appointees had not held elected office at Rome. The epitome of 
Livy says that Sulla filled the Senate ex equestri ordine (Per 89); technically, new senators 
were always former equestrians, but this passage may imply that some at least came from 
non-senatorial families.44 In this connection, there is a considerable number (forty-three) of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sullan qualifying office. Sulla’s inclusion of ex-quaestors sits neatly alongside the 
establishment of the quaestorship as the criterion for entry to the Senate from 81 onwards. 
43 Appian’s figure is suspiciously round and may arise from a belief that Sulla doubled the 
size of the Senate, though there is no good evidence that that method underpinned either the 
co-option in 81 (since the Senate was almost certainly much smaller than 300 at that point) or 
the structural shift through the expansion of the quaestorship: see below. Nonetheless, Appian 
is credible in his presentation of a very large influx. Since we do not know the precise 
number of quaestors before Sulla, the number of appointees under this criterion in the years 
86-82 was somewhere between forty or sixty; given inevitable attrition, they may have 
formed at little as ten percent of the new appointments. (Sulla might logically also have 
included men who had held the quaestorship prior to the census of 86 and no further office; 
they, in accordance with pre-Sullan norms, would not necessarily have become senators at 
that census. There is no attested example of this category, but since its members were by 
definition obscure the possibility remains.) 
44 Sall. Cat. 37 has Sulla’s new senators created ex gregariis militibus: this may reflect anti-
Sullan sentiment, but does suggest that the new senators came from backgrounds which had 
individuals who are attested in the Senate after 80 but are not known to have held a 
magistracy.45 This group of new senators who had not held elected office were, we can 
reasonably assume, fervent supporters of Sulla, and very probably beneficiaries of the 
proscriptions; the process of appointment was an opportunity for Sulla to reward his 
adherents from the equestrian class with senatorial status. But it is impossible to reach any 
very satisfactory conclusions about the identity of the new senators beyond the characteristics 
of Sullan and equestrian, and the most recent prosopographical survey describes its results as 
‘disappointing’.46  
 
This lectio made the Senate larger than it had ever been, with about 450 members, some two-
thirds of whom were new. Thereafter, there was a change from appointment through a lectio 
to membership following automatically from election to the quaestorship. Since the number 
                                                                                                                                                        
not previously produced such. Cf Hist. 1.55.21M, with its reference to the new senator 
Fufidius, ancilla turpis, honorum omnium dehonestamentum. See further C. Nicolet, L’Ordre 
Equestre à l’époque républicaine (312 – 43 av. J.C) (Paris, 1974), 573-91; P.Spann, ‘C. L., or 
M. Cotta and “unspeakable” Fufidius: a note on Sulla’s res publica restituta’, CJ 82 (1987), 
306-9. On the entry of men from non-senatorial families into the Senate more generally 
during the Republic, see K. Hopkins and G. Burton,  Death and Renewal: sociological 
studies in Roman history, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1983), 31-119. 
45 Santangelo (n. 17), 18-19. It cannot however be assumed that all in this category were 
Sullan appointments, or that they had not in fact held office, since information about the 
holders of junior positions is so patchy. 
46 Santangelo (n. 17), 20. In particular, there is no sign that Sulla took this opportunity 
systematically to integrate the newly enfranchised Italian domi nobiles into the Roman 
governing class. 
of quaestors had risen to twenty, the Senate’s larger size would be maintained through the 
accession of twenty new senators each year.47 The actual size of the Senate after Sulla as a 
result of the increase in the number of quaestors to twenty cannot be calculated in the absence 
of actuarial tables and membership data; in addition, the Sullan system did not quite have 
time to settle into a stable state.48 For an annual recruitment of twenty individuals aged thirty 
to produce an overall size of six hundred, an average male life expectancy, at the age of 
thirty, of sixty years is required. This figure is higher than most modern estimates of probable 
Roman population structure.49 It also contrasts with the imperial Senate: this body also 
recruited twenty quaestors a year and maintained a size of six hundred, but the minimum age 
for entry was twenty-five.  A reasonable conclusion is that the size of the post-Sullan Senate 
rose gradually from a total of around 450, immediately after Sulla’s co-options, towards a 
figure between five and six hundred.50 The size of the new Senate was soon noticeable in 
built form, since Sulla enlarged the existing Senate House.51 
                                                 
47 Tac. Ann. 11.22 (number of quaestors); App. B Civ. 1.100 (order of office-holding). It is 
unclear whether ex-quaestors were now automatically members of the Senate, or belonged to 
a category of those who were not senators, would be enrolled as senators in the next lectio, 
and in the meantime had the right to speak in the Senate (see Lintott [n. 6], 68-72). 
48 If we accept 49 B.C. as its end, it lasted for thirty-two years; that is, it ended before the 
Senate – given life membership - could be expected to consist only of men who had become 
senators after Sulla’s changes. Val. Max. 8.13.4 and Plin. NH 7.157 imply that there were 
eight counter-examples.  
49 See the discussion in W. Scheidel, ‘Emperors, aristocrats, and the grim reaper’, CQ 49 
(1999), 254-281. 
50 The largest known attendance at a post-Sullan meeting of the Senate is 417 in 57 B.C. A 
further complication arises from the tribunate of the plebs. Sulla’s restrictions on the tribunate 
 The Senate as Sulla recreated it was not the body it had been prior to the Social War. That 
Senate had been composed of the res publica’s greatest men, chosen by the censors whose 
decisions mediated the popular will, as demonstrated in elections for higher office, through 
their judgement of individual virtue. Sulla’s Senate contained his adherents, men identified 
for their personal loyalty during civil war. The composition of his Senate, combined with the 
exclusion of his enemies’ descendents from public office, ensured that the consequences of 
civil war would continue to be embedded in the res publica for decades.52 Decisions about its 
membership thereafter were handed directly to the people, whose capacity to choose was 
nonetheless limited, insofar as senatorial membership now depended on the relatively 
indiscriminating quaestorial elections.53 The effects of this strongly Sullan membership were 
                                                                                                                                                        
may well have included their exclusion from senate membership, but repeal of the lex Atinia 
is not actually attested. For the years 81-75 this uncertainty translates directly into uncertainty 
about the size of the Senate, if some of the 70 tribunes elected during these years had not 
already held the quaestorship. After the passage of the lex Aurelia in 75, the tribunate of the 
plebs was reintegrated into the career plans of plebeian senators; thereafter, it seems 
reasonable to assume that tribunes tended to be ex-quaestors, and so tribunician membership 
of the Senate (implied fairly securely post-70 in the context of the lifting of all of Sulla’s 
restrictions) would have little or no impact on its overall size.  
51 Cic. Fin. 5.2; cf. Flower (n. 5), 121 n. 11. 
52 Ryan (n. 12), 288 n. 265 suggests that Sulla’s lectio contained a high proportion of younger 
men. 
53 This point is a matter of degree, not kind; since the lex Atinia, tribunician status brought 
with it membership of the Senate. But it would be interesting to know how many candidates 
for the quaestorship in excess of twenty there now tended to be. No failures to be elected 
compounded by the increase in size. Hawthorn neatly summarised the issue: ‘There is almost 
nothing you can do to an exclusive and aristocratic body which is worse than flooding it with 
new members’.54 The survivors of the pre-Sullan Senate found themselves outnumbered, 
perhaps by as much as two to one, by new members whose qualifications for being chosen 
included their loyalty and commitment to Sulla and his regime and whose prior experience of 
participation in the res publica was in many cases limited or even non-existent.55 The 
experience of the new senators as senators was also very different. Sulla’s nominees to the 
Senate were not all, as we have seen, former office holders; and there does not seem to have 
been any obligation on them to stand for the quaestorship subsequent to their joining the 
Senate.56 There was thus, from 81 onwards, a group of senators, initially around 250 in 
number and gradually declining thereafter as a result of natural wastage, who had never held 
an elected office. The role of this group was, in all probability, to serve on juries. That was a 
consequence of Sulla’s decision to entrust the juries in his new courts to senators; and 
although we have little evidence for the way in which other senatorial tasks were allocated, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
quaestor are known after 80, and only one before (Cic. Planc. 52); see further F. Pina Polo, 
‘Veteres candidati: losers in the elections in republican Rome’, in F. Marco Simón et al. 
(edd.), Vae Victis: perdedores en el mundo antiguo (Barcelona, 2012), 63-82. 
54 R. Hawthorn, ‘The Senate after Sulla’, G&R 9 (1962), 53-60, at 55. 
55 Some of Sulla’s new senators had presumably been equestrian jurors in the decade before 
the Social War. On Sulla’s new senators as a group see J. Paterson, ‘Politics in the Late 
Republic’, in T.P. Wiseman (ed.), Roman Political Life 90 BC-AD 69 (Exeter, 1985), 21-44, 
at 23-27; Flower (n. 5),122. 
56 There was unlikely to be any prohibition, either. But it would have taken over a decade for 
all of Sulla’s non-quaestorial appointees to hold the office, and that would have precluded 
anyone else from starting a career in public life. 
seems unlikely that they would have been handed over to men who had no prior experience 
of administering the res publica.57 Ryan’s hypothesis that it is this group of men who were 
called pedarii is very attractive.58 The name suggests a degree of scorn from their office-
holding senatorial peers. There was a tension between the reality of an enlarged Senate, 
divorced from its traditional relationship with the Roman people through office-holding, and 
the presentation of Sulla’s victory as that of the nobilitas.59 This tension may have 
contributed significantly to the extraordinary lectio conducted by the censors elected in 70 
B.C., which expelled an unprecendent 64 senators, and apart from one of the consuls of 71, 
Sura, no senator who had held imperium is attested among those expelled. If the censors of 70 
were defining, however informally, unworthiness to belong to the Senate in terms that 
targeted the surviving Sullan appointees, then the general message of renewal and reform to 
which their lectio contributed would be supplemented by a specific move away from the 
Sullan Senate as constituted during the previous decade.60 
 
Sulla’s appointments to the Senate increased its size very considerably and were, it appears, 
embedded informally in a distinction between those who had entered in this manner and those 
                                                 
57 On the experience of senators in the 70s, see further C. Steel, ‘The Roman Senate and the 
post-Sullan res publica’, forthcoming in Historia  63.3 (2014). 
58 Ryan (n. 12), 85-87. 
59 The reasons for the continuing success of the nobiles in elections through the seventies 
deserve further attention; one question is the extent to which preference for a candidate with 
consular ancestry was perceived by voters as a gesture for or against the res publica as Sulla 
had reconstituted it. On the identification between Sulla’s régime and the nobiles, see Cic. 
Rosc. Am. 16, where Sulla’s victory is described as uictoria nobilitatis. 
60 See further Steel (n. 55). 
who had served as magistrates. The new senatorial class inevitably drew on a wider group of 
families than those who had filled the pre-Social War Senate; but the existing elite was not 
replaced, except insofar as individual families had chosen the wrong side in the civil war, and 
its pre-eminence was confirmed initially by Sulla’s support in consular elections and 
subsequently, for whatever reason, by the electorate. Sulla’s changes to the Senate were not 
driven by a wish for, and did not result in, a change in the composition of the ruling elite.  
 
Their purpose and explanation lie elsewhere in Sulla’s programme of change. Flower has 
more recently described Sulla’s republic as ‘a political constitution based on laws and their 
regular enforcement by a system of courts’.61 This interpretation offers an attractive 
framework for understanding what Sulla attempted to achieve, and can be connected with the 
changes to senatorial procedure which reduced scope for debate as well as to the creation of a 
group of senators whose role, as jurors, was ‘the task of policing Roman society, and 
especially the behaviour of its most powerful senatorial elites’.62 Moreover, it gains further 
support from a consideration of the Senate’s behaviour in the recent past, when the Senate 
had taken a line of action distinct from that of the consuls, with destructive consequences.63 
The shift in power from the Senate to imperium-holding magistrates that resulted from 
                                                 
61 Flower (n. 5), 129. 
62 Flower (n. 5), 128. It is nonetheless important to note that Sulla did not create a written 
constitution for Rome: the method he employed – legislation on discrete issues, often 
modifying earlier statutes – was the same as that used by earlier reformers, and subject to the 
same prospect of subsequent modification or repeal. 
63 In 91 the consul Philippus fell out disastrously with the Senate, claiming that he needed a 
different consilium (Cic. De or. 3.2); and in 87 the Senate stripped Cinna of his consulship, 
citing the authority of the Sibylline books (see Morstein-Marx (n. 7), 265-6)  
Sulla’s changes can be seen as a response to these moments of conflict which, as elsewhere in 
his programme, sought to establish unipolar rather than multipolar locations of power. These 
separate spheres were now defined by law.64 
 
Such a reading is radically different from the standard interpretation of Sulla’s res publica as 
one in which the Senate was dominant. But even so it arguably does not quite go far enough 
in explaining either Sulla’s purposes, insofar as those can be divined, or the results which 
actually occurred. The Senate became – and perhaps Sulla conceptualised this as a return to – 
a consilium for magistrates, whose function was to offer advice when asked for it by 
magistrates. As the body which contained the res publica’s most distinguished citizens, it 
also was the right organ from which to draw the jurors in legal cases which affected the res 
publica. If that were the case, it would explain why Sulla was willing to recruit so heavily 
into his Senate; it did not need the authority to act independently, and he had no cause to be 
concerned about the outraged feelings of its existing members. 
 
Finally, this interpretation of the Sullan Senate helps to explain why, in practice, the Sullan 
res publica did not last, either in its initial form beyond 70, or more fundamentally beyond 
the outbreak of civil war in 49. Many other factors, above all the response of the Roman 
people to their loss of power and prestige, are involved. But the Senate was a major design 
flaw in the overall framework of the res publica as constituted by Sulla. The Senate was 
composed of two groups with interchangeable membership and conflicting ambitions: those 
                                                 
64 This framework may also explain the presence in Sulla’s legislation on a law concerning 
maiestas – a charge whose initial legal definition was the work of the popularis tribune 
Saturninus. Imperium-holding magistrates were at the heart of his res publica and were to 
operate within a defined system of rules. 
who policed the actions of the res publica’s agents through the courts, and those who acted 
for the res publica as magistrates.65 Such a system of oversight could only work effectively if 
the two groups remained separate, but there was continual traffic between the two groups, as 
men stood for office, were elected as magistrates and then returned to the status of private 
individuals. If Sulla had hoped that his appointees would act as a bulwark for his changes he 
was to be disappointed; and was himself largely responsible for its failure, because he did not 
provide a mechanism for their renewal and because he also supported the re-emergence of an 
exclusive nobility which largely monopolized access to imperium. This group, in turn, had 
only a few years to wait before they felt confident in challenging Sulla’s res publica, and its 
senatorial supporters, and restoring, albeit in an unstable form, a framework which permitted 
the traditional exchange of favours between aristocrats and the Roman people. 
 
The view that Sulla strengthened the Senate can only be maintained if one believes that larger 
bodies are more effective than smaller ones. That is clearly not the case. At somewhere 
between 500 and 600 members, the post-Sullan Senate was not a place where productive 
discussion took place. It existed to confirm the distinction of those whom the Roman people 
had elected to office and to demonstrate that the res publica’s best citizens advised its 
magistrates on the conduct of public affairs. It had a useful subsidiary role of avoiding 
judicial conflict by supplying jurors. But its prominence after Sulla is an illusion, created by 
the suppression of the people. Sulla’s vision had no need of a ‘strong Senate’: power and 
authority belonged to the magistrates. 
 
CATHERINE STEEL 
                                                 
65 This conflict closely mirrored the division between senators with ambitions towards high 
office and those without. 
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